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We estimate, from first-principles, the rate of inter-party avalanche involvements. The model
suggests that the likelihood of inter-party involvements is quadratic in the density of parties –
twice as many parties quadruples the likelihood. The model predicts that when the product of the
party-density and the area of a day’s potential avalanches approaches one, inter-party avalanche
involvements will become a substantial fraction of all avalanche involvements. As a corollary, the
relative rate of inter-party involvements is expected to increase with avalanche size. We argue, with
selected North American inter-party incidents from 2001-2019, that inter-party involvements are
a timely concern. To spur conversation, we enumerate a variety of strategies that may mitigate
inter-party hazard.
For Monty Busbee[1], and for you.
I. INTRODUCTION
The number and density of backcountry travelers con-
tinues to increase[2–5] in the United States and around
the world. Many have written[6–9] about the emerging
hazard of inter-party involvements. At some density of
backcountry travelers, avalanches triggered by one party
will be likely to strike another. This work gives formal
voice to this idea and, further, suggests that the time
when such involvements become frequent is either now
or in the near future. In Section II, we estimate the
relevant critical density from first principles. In Section
III, we enumerate several recent inter-party avalanche
incidents in North America. In Section IV, we enumer-
ate and discuss strategies that may partially mitigate
the risk.
This work provides a framework within which to dis-
cuss and estimate the magnitude of the concern, ad-
dresses it directly as a hazard, and attempts to spur
discussion of strategies to reduce the likelihood of fu-
ture inter-party involvements.
II. ESTIMATION
To assess inter-party avalanche involvements as a con-
cern, it is useful to develop a first-principles model for
their likelihood. The estimation that follows is a sim-
ple approach that is likely to require small corrections
to yield quantitative predictions. This model has quali-
tative predictive power, predicting both that the inter-
party involvement rate is quadratic in party density and
that there is a critical party-density at which the inter-
party involvement rate becomes significant.
∗ cah49@uw.edu
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Figure 1. Diagram showing the definitions of A,
Astartzone,and Aavalanche. Astartzone is the area of a day’s
typical individual start-zone. Nparties here is 7.
A. Derivation
Suppose that there are Nparties parties of winter trav-
elers in a region of area A, shown in Figure 1, where
Nparties > 1. This analysis is independent of the defini-
tion of a “party”, but for the estimates that follow, we
define a party as “any group, as small as one person,
that travels independently”. Let nparty = Nparties/A
be the party-density. Here, we define an avalanche “in-
volvement” as an interaction between a party and an
avalanche, an “incident” as an event in which at least
one involvement occurs, and an “accident” as an inci-
dent that yielded significant injury or death. If there
are few-enough parties that they are only ever caught
in their own avalanches, one expects the avalanche-
involvement (and incident) rate per unit area per unit
time, rsingle-party, to be proportional to the party den-
sity:
rsingle-party = r0nparty (1)
ar
X
iv
:1
91
0.
10
66
8v
1 
 [p
hy
sic
s.s
oc
-p
h]
  2
3 O
ct 
20
19
2The implication is straightforward: More parties, pro-
portionally more involvements. We estimate the many
factors subsumed into r0 (avalanches per party per unit
time) in Appendix B.
What if there are enough parties that there is a chance
one group could trigger a slide that hits another group?
There are two important factors:
1. When there are more parties in an area, they will
trigger more avalanches (rate r0nparty), as before.
2. If the average avalanche that day sweeps through
an area Aavalanche, the number of other parties
that will be struck by that avalanche is approx-
imately1 Aavalanchenparty.
So, the rate of inter-party avalanche involvements,
rinterparty, ought to scale like
rinterparty = rsingle-partyAavalanchenparty
Thus,
rinterparty = r0Aavalanchen
2
party. (2)
The rate of inter-party involvements should scale
like the party-density squared (n2). This is the key
observation.
Why is n2party important? Let’s look at the rate that
parties will have an involvement of either kind by sum-
ming the rates:
rincident = ravalanche + rinterparty
That is:
rincident = r0(nparty +Aavalanchen
2
party)
or, suggestively,
rincident = r0nparty(1 +Aavalanchenparty) (3)
An illustrative plot of these rates is shown in Figure 2.
If the party density, nparty, is small, then n2party is
smaller still, just as (0.1)2 is 0.01. If nparty is larger than
1, though, then n2party dominates the problem, just as
102 is 100. What, then, sets the scale of "1" ?
Equation 3 holds the answer: Once Aavalanchenparty &
1, inter-party involvements will dominate. This makes
1 We assume a uniform distribution of parties and that Nparties
is “large”. The result for any Nparties is derived in Appendix
A. The correction to Equation 2 is (Nparties−1)/Nparties, never
more-impactful than a factor of two.
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Figure 2. Illustrative plots showing quadratic growth in
inter-party involvements surpassing linear growth in single-
party involvements when npartyAavalanche exceeds 1; when
there is more than one party per avalanche-area. The inter-
party critical density for an Aavalanche = 0.2 km2 avalanche,
as in this example, is ncritical = 5 parties/km2. The vertical
scale will vary widely with snowpack properties (see Ap-
pendix B), but the relative rates between single-party and
inter-party involvements depend only on Aavalanche. The pa-
rameters chosen for these plots highlight the importance of
both avalanche size and party density – when avalanches are
large or parties are close together, inter-party involvement
becomes likely.
sense – once there is roughly one party per avalanche-
area, any triggered avalanche is likely to hit another
party. This notion is intuitive – in-bounds avalanches
at ski areas are scary in large part because the skier-
density is so high.
We define this critical density as ncritical ≡
1/Aavalanche. It is of particular utility because it de-
pends only on the expected size of a day’s avalanches,
and not on any other property of a day’s anticipated
instability, including the likelihood of triggering a slide.
While it is difficult to predict the absolute involve-
ment rate, as the determination of r0 is uncertain, one
can consider the ratio of inter-party involvements to to-
tal involvements:
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Figure 3. Upper Panel: Approximate fraction of inter-party
avalanche involvements as a function of party-density, mea-
sured in units of avalanche-area, as described by Equation 4.
Lower Panel: Approximate values of npartyAavalanche from
incidents described in Section III. It is interesting that all but
three of the incidents occurred with npartyAavalanche near 0.1.
rinterparty
rincident
=
Aavalanchen
2
party
nparty +Aavalanchen2party
(4)
=
1
1
npartyAavalanche
+ 1
As shown in Figure 3, this has the expected behav-
ior, where inter-party involvements become significant
as npartyAavalanche approaches 1.
B. Relationship of inter-party involvement rate to
avalanche size
Equations 2 and 3 have an important corollary: If
the size or likelihood of a day’s avalanches is greater, we
should expect the rate at which inter-party involvements
occur to be greater. If slides are more likely, r0 will tend
to increase, and if slides are larger, Aavalanche is larger.
As backcountry travelers, larger and more-likely slides
will force wary travelers to consider larger areas (further
uphill) and more places (increased number of potential
start zones) in the context of inter-party incidents. In
our model, incidents with Aavalanchenparty & 1 are likely
to include inter-party involvements. Indeed, if Aavalanche
is large-enough, as in the 0.13 km2 Jumbo Mountain
slide[10], backcountry travelers can even bury parties
sitting at home on a sofa.
C. Relationship of inter-party involvement rate to
terrain
Looking at the equations alone, one would expect
both the incident rate and the inter-party involvement
rate to be relatively low. Even in mountainous terrain,
start-zones are comparatively small, and much of the
area is not avalanche terrain.
Critically, however, backcountry travelers are often
concentrated in both start zones and avalanche terrain
by the desire for quality skiing and the travel-focusing
effects of terrain itself. Furthermore, limited access
points (mountain passes/trailheads) for those parties
tend to further concentrate those parties into yet higher
densities.
These concentrated party densities can be large. As
an example, consider “The Slot”, a popular backcountry
ski route at Snoqualmie Pass, WA. In its narrow up-
per reaches, it is perhaps 30 m wide and 250 m long.
If there are but two parties in the couloir, the effec-
tive party density is greater than 250 parties/km2. For
scale, the population density of the nearby city of Seat-
tle, Washington is ∼ 3400 people/km2 [11].
D. Weather and snow conditions as density and
consequence amplifiers
1. Storm-skiing
It is a guess, but the Pacific-Northwestern inter-
party avalanche hazard may be at its greatest on deep-
snow storm-skiing days, when trail-breaking is arduous,
avalanches are likely, and powder fever is high. Arduous
trail-breaking may be the most-powerful concentrator of
backcountry travelers, amplifying the already-powerful
magnetism of an extant skintrack.
On storm-skiing days, day-tripping backcountry trav-
elers embark from a limited set of trailheads and head
for a limited set of “safe” objectives. In Western Wash-
ington State, with a population of thousands of active
backcountry travelers[12], there are approximately nine
such popular trailheads. As skintracks are forged more-
deeply into the morning, they bifurcate, but the number
of traditional and natural ski options remains slim.
2. Optimal conditions
“Good” conditions can concentrate parties. Moun-
tains and routes offer only certain optimal times for
passage. In the Cascades, and perhaps everywhere, this
4can be seen prominently in periods of spring/summer
skiing; both snowpack and limited access curtail skiing
at other times. There are narrow optimal windows for
all of Tahoma/Rainier’s Fuhrer Finger, the North Face
of the Northwest Ridge of Pahto/Adams, and Ulrich’s
Couloir of Stuart – these are listed for their combina-
tion of popularity and constrained terrain, where a small
summer slide can ravage anyone below. Indeed, on April
1, 2019, it was reported[13] that 16 people attempted,
and bottlenecked, the ski route on the Grand Teton.
Wintertime weather windows provide perhaps even
more temporal concentration, as the number of good
days for attempting bold routes is slim, perhaps only one
or two weekends per season. Fortunately, for now, the
number of skiers attempting bold winter routes seems
low-enough that inter-party hazard is likely to be a sub-
dominant concern.
In addition to temporal concentration at the scale of
days, safety and snow-quality considerations may also
concentrate parties on shorter durations. Springtime
daily melt-freeze/corn cycles can constrain safe travel
to time intervals measured in hours. The arrival of a
storm or imminent warming can force travelers to en-
ter or cross slopes before hazard increases. Finally, the
perceived pressure from other people, whether to make
the first tracks on a slope or, again paradoxically, to
cross/descend a slope before the presence of other par-
ties can make the slope more hazardous, can concentrate
parties in small areas.
3. Reduced visibility
If nearby parties cannot be seen, as in the Lizard
Range incident (Section IIIA), and the distances be-
tween parties are greater than that allowed by voice
contact, it is impossible to be aware of anyone above or
below. In low-visibility conditions in densely-traveled
areas, this may drive us to avoid descending or ascend-
ing an otherwise-reasonable route simply because it may
not be possible to verify that the route is free of other
travelers.
III. SIGNIFICANT INCIDENTS
Here, we enumerate a series of inter-party incidents,
near-misses, and possible inter-party incidents. We
provide a subjective summary from an inter-party-
involvement perspective. The references offer expanded
detail. Several of the incidents appear to have been re-
ported only informally. It is a surprise that it has been
difficult to find formal accident reports for some mod-
ern Canadian avalanches, each of which have required
rescue or a coroner.
While the catalyst for this paper is the accident de-
scribed in Section IIIH, these incidents are presented in
chronological order. This enumeration is not intended
to be comprehensive, but rather to provide both a sense
of the varied types of inter-party involvements and to
make clear that these involvements happen.
For incidents where documentation makes it possible,
we have attempted to measure the areas in question, the
number of parties, and compute both the party density
and npartyAavalanche, summarized in Table I. The ar-
eas were measured using Caltopo[14] and attempt to
cover the terrain that would reasonably be regarded
as “connected” by an observer on the ground; this is
a somewhat-subjective quantity (see Appendix B 1). At
Krause’s suggestion[15], we include the avalanche type,
to the extent that it is reported in the record.
A. Lizard Range, February 13, 2001
A party of five skiers crossed over a ridgeline outside
the Fernie Ski Area, intent on skiing a constrained 35-
40-degree route. As they prepared for descent, a ski
cut triggered a 24 m-wide and 28 cm-deep wind-slab
avalanche[16–20], sweeping down the route and out of
sight. At approximately the same time, a party of thir-
teen foreign skiers was hit by a size-2.5 avalanche while
traversing the side of the valley below. Six skiers were
caught, resulting in two fatalities. A third party wit-
nessed the entire incident and immediately returned to-
ward the ski area to raise an alarm. On the way, they
encountered the first party, which was unaware of the
slide’s impact on the second party.
B. Empress Lake, March 20, 2004
A party of snowmobilers[16, 21–25] assessed a cliff-
drop in steep terrain, concluding that the expected in-
stability was sufficiently manageable. The cliff-drop
was attempted, triggering a small slab and appar-
ently damaging a sled. As the party regrouped mid-
path and assessed the damage, a second party ap-
peared. The second party climbed immediately into
the now-overhead start-zone, triggering a D2.5 slide
(30 m×125-150 m×150 cm crown). Three were caught,
one was killed.
C. Nisqually/Wilson Glaciers, June 14, 2008
On a weekend that surprised skiers on at least three
Cascadian volcanoes[26–29] with large summer slab
avalanches, a party of skiers descending the slopes of
Tahoma/Mount Rainier triggered a slab[30] that caught
an ascending solo splitboarder and nearly caught an as-
cending climbing party at the convergence of the Wilson
and Nisqually glaciers. The splitboarder and triggering
skier were carried and sustained only minor injury. A
second trip-report[31] from Rainier’s south side empha-
sizes the day’s instability during what is generally prime
volcano-ski season.
5D. Boulder/Turbo Mountain, March 13, 2010
Perhaps the most-spectacular inter-party
accident[32–34] of which the author is aware: A
snowmobiling festival/competition, with snowmobiles
highmarking above ∼ 200 spectators at the time of the
slide, was directly struck by a D3 slide presumed to
have been triggered by a participant. Approximately
forty people were buried, with 32 injured and two
fatalities. The on-scene coordination and rapid rescue
response were remarkably effective for such a chaotic
event.
After-action review[35] notes the probability of legal
charges in similar future events.
E. Eagle Pass Avalanche, March 19, 2010
Only an Incident Summary[36], an Avalanche Involve-
ment Report[37], and an associated photograph appear
to be available for this accident; this synopsis is com-
posed from news articles and indirect references in the
Boulder Mountain accident reporting. One week follow-
ing the Boulder Mountain slide, a snowmobiling party
of two may have triggered a D3.5 slide above one or two
parties of at least ten snowmobilers, yielding one fatal-
ity and at least one injury[32, 38, 39]. The total number
of people involved may have been as large as 21[35].
F. Little Cottonwood “Frenzy”, November 13,
2011
In November of 2011, the year’s first skiable snow
arrived atop faceted autumn snow, drawing many back-
country skiers into the un-opened Little Cottonwood
Canyon ski resorts. At least 11 human-triggered
avalanches were reported, yielding one fatality and one
broken femur. Perhaps most-striking in the fatality’s
accident report[40]:
It was reported that other parties at Alta
continued to ski and knock down avalanches
into Greeley Bowl while the rescue was in
progress. Creating another incident during
this situation is unacceptable.
G. Taylor Mountain Near-Miss, January 24, 2012
A skier ski-cutting a popular run on a reportedly-
unstable day triggered a D3.5, R4 avalanche[41] that
crossed the uptrack for nearby slopes and ascended an
adjoining slope. The uptrack was buried under up to
twenty feet of debris. Fortunately, nobody was caught,
though a small shift in timing would have yielded
an inter-party accident. The outcry and subsequent
discussion[42–44] was intense and sustained.
H. Kendall Peak, December 19, 2015
This accident is the catalyst for this work. As de-
tailed by the NWAC accident report[1], a solo skier dis-
appeared after early afternoon on December 19, the first
deep storm-skiing Saturday of the 2015/2016 season at
Snoqualmie Pass[45]. The number of skiers and parties
in the area was unusually high, with at least nine par-
ties recreating in a single square kilometer. In Table I,
the estimations of A and N are correlated, hence the
diminished range of nparty.
After an extensive search effort, exceeding 3000
person-hours, the solo-skier’s remains were recovered on
June 4, 2016. The accident location, and the injuries to
the skier, were consistent with an avalanche-related fa-
tality. Subsequent investigation revealed that two par-
ties had triggered avalanches uphill of the accident site
on the afternoon of the skier’s disappearance. Further-
more, the first of those avalanches can be regarded as an
inter-party near miss, as a minute’s difference in timing
would have seen the second party struck by the first.
NWAC’s analysis of the accident does not take a po-
sition on whether the fatality was caused by an inter-
party avalanche – both a third avalanche triggered by
the soloist or a natural avalanche remain viable hypothe-
ses.
I. Rogers Pass, Avalanche Crest, February 14,
2016
A party of two led the way into an alpine zone in an
attempt to get ahead of the Rogers Pass crowds[46, 47].
After a short lap, they encountered four other parties
(from four nationalities!) on their way up Avalanche
Crest proper. Two of the foreign parties trailed them
as they pushed higher. The party of two reached their
highpoint and skied. Before they were clear of the line,
one of the parties above began to ski, triggering a D2.5-
3 avalanche[48]. Both of the skiers below were caught
and carried, one sustaining life-threatening injury.
J. Grandfather Couloir, April 3, 2016
As detailed by the CAIC accident report[49] and sub-
sequent lawsuit[50, 51], two parties of two met above a
consequential couloir with a mandatory mid-route rap-
pel. The couloir is adjoined by Oblivion Bowl, which
also funnels through the mid-route choke. Recogniz-
ing the inter-party hazard, the two parties agreed to
let Group 1 ski and rappel first, while Group 2 waited
above for a cell-phone call. (Group 1 had radios, and
the region, Bear Creek, has a pioneering community ra-
dio protocol, see Section IVE, but Group 2 did not.)
Group 1 skied the couloir without incident but, while
mid-rappel, was struck by a slide from above, sustain-
ing injury. Group 2 had waited roughly 45 minutes and
attempted to call Group 1 once. Warming snow and
6the imminent arrival of at least one more Group had
spurred Group 2 into skiing before receiving a call from
Group 1. Group 2 triggered an R1D1 sluff – the same
slide that struck Group 1.
The judgment from the San Miguel County Court is
notable for its detailed analysis of the accident, its hu-
manity, and reasoned approach to assigning fault. Pur-
suant to important details in the case, Group 2 was
found to be financially liable for the injuries sustained
by Group 1.
K. Mt. Herman, March 4, 2017
As reported in NWAC’s accident summaries[52]:
Widespread 1-2 ft storm slabs and larger 3-5
ft wind slabs were reported in the backcoun-
try near Mt Baker on Saturday, March 4th.
An incident occurred on Mt Herman when a
large wind slab on an east aspect was trig-
gered from a party above, partially burying
two and completely burying one in a sep-
arate party at the base of the slide path.
The impacted party was transitioning back
to climbing skins when they were caught in
the avalanche.
L. Hawkins Mountain, March 4, 2017
As detailed by the NWAC accident report[53], a party
of two snowmobilers triggered a large slide (D2+). At
the time of the slide, a separate party of two snowmo-
bilers was eating lunch in the runout zone, with their
machines turned off. The lower party ran from the slide
– their sleds and rescue gear were buried. The lower
party was able to rescue one of the triggering snowmo-
bilers and locate/extract the body of the second[54].
M. Bear Creek, Temptation slide path, February
19, 2019
A group of three snowboarders left the Telluride
ski area to ski a permanently-closed but frequently-
skied[55] route. Partway through the descent, a boarder
triggered a slide that stepped down, D2 in size, running
2,000 vertical feet[56]. The slide buried six feet deep a
solo skier out for a short exercise jaunt on a heavily-used
trail.
Seeing many tracks entering and leaving the deposi-
tion zone, the uphill party beacon-searched and spot-
probed the debris pile without result before returning
to town. The solo skier, reported missing by his wife,
was located by probe-line the following day.
N. Common threads
While this enumeration is not intended to be com-
prehensive, it is interesting to look for commonalities
among the incidents. Two stand out: 1) For those in-
cidents where npartyAavalanche can be estimated, 6 out
of 9 overlapped npartyAavalanche ∼ 0.1. This is smaller
than the most-natural expectation of Equation 4, but it
is encouraging to find a possible invariant. The model
is, of course, blind to any propensity for parties to avoid
one-another. 2) Eleven out of twelve incidents involved
slab avalanches. Whether this is simple correlation with
size/frequency or more meaningful must await further
study. The Grandfather Couloir incident shows that
loose slides can cause inter-party incidents as well2.
IV. MITIGATION
It is unlikely, and perhaps undesirable, that the num-
ber of backcountry travelers will be reduced. Therefore,
we must find ways to limit the likelihood of inter-party
incidents. The following are strategies that may mit-
igate the risk. There are certainly more – these are
suggested to organize and catalyze discussion.
A. Awareness and Education
Awareness of the increasing likelihood of inter-party
conflict with density may, on its own, help to curtail
inter-party involvements. That is, of course, the intent
of this work. In places where the density of travelers
approaches the critical density, the hazard should be
discussed and mitigated. At least a passing mention of
inter-party hazard in avalanche education at all levels
now seems prudent.
As better understanding of the factors that lead
to inter-party avalanche involvements becomes under-
stood, it will make sense to bring light to the hazard
in avalanche bulletins. A key takeaway for forecasters
is the apparent importance of avalanche size in deter-
mining the likelihood of inter-party involvements, espe-
cially in situations (e.g. persistent weaknesses) where
avalanche size alone may not convince travelers to stay
home.
B. Density reduction
The root of inter-party incidents is not the number of
backcountry travelers, but their density. Backcountry
travelers use a tiny fraction of North American alpine
2 It is the author’s opinion that there will eventually be a loose-
wet inter-party incident in the Cascades, as the popularity of
accessible Spring skiing continues to grow.
7Incident Type A (km2) Nparties nparty(parties/km2) Aavalanche(km2) npartyAavalanche
Lizard Range Wind Slab,
cross-loading
2-4.5 3+ 0.7-1.5 ∼ 0.1 0.04-0.3
Empress Lake Dry Slab ∼ 1.2 2 1.6 ∼ 0.05 0.05-0.1
Nisqually/Wilson Slab ∼ 1.3 3+ ≥ 2.3 ∼0.02 0.03-0.08
Boulder/Turbo Mountain Persistent Slab 1-2 30-100 15-100 ∼ 0.2 3-20
Eagle Pass (possible) Slab 1-2 2-3 0.5-3 > 0.3 0.15-3
Taylor Mountain Hard Slab ∼ 0.8 > 0.3
Kendall Peak (possible) Slab 0.2-1.0 3-9 9-15 0.003-0.01 0.03-0.15
Avalanche Crest/Rogers Slab 2-5 5+ 1-5
Grandfather Couloir Loose Snow ∼ 0.16 2 ∼ 12.5 0.02-0.08 0.3-1
Mount Herman Wind Slab 0.4-1.2 2+ > 2-5
Hawkins Mountain Soft Slab 0.6-1 2-3 2-5 0.03-0.05 0.06-0.25
Bear Creek, Temptation Soft Slab 0.3-1.3 2+ 1.5-7 ∼ 0.03 0.05-0.2
Table I. Quantitative characterization of inter-party incidents. The estimation of A is inherently subjective and uncertain.
The model predicts that inter-party incidents become likely as npartyAavalanche approaches 1. Eleven out of twelve incidents
involve slab avalanches.
terrain, perhaps primarily due to access constraints.
Following the Kendall Peak accident[1], the author has
sharply curtailed trips into densely-skied terrain, choos-
ing lesser-known destinations, difficult access, or lower-
quality snow in order to decrease overhead risk from
other parties. While this strategy has limits, there are
still lonely places with great skiing to be found on the
map.
As advocacy organizations work to expand winter-
time access, it may be reasonable to add safety to the
reasons for improved access. Inferring from our esti-
mates, it is natural to encourage party densities be-
low one per characteristic-avalanche-size. D2 slides are
roughly 0.01 km2 in area. D3 slides are roughly 0.1 km2
in area[57]. Hence, encouraging party densities below
10-100 parties/km2 in localized avalanche terrain would
be wise, and ten-times lower (intimated by Figure 3)
may be prudent.
C. Travel practices
If density cannot be wholly avoided, then we must
find ways to limit our susceptibility to other parties and
the risks we may pose to others. We cannot control
others’ choices, but we can control our own.
1. Defensive routefinding
Like defensive driving, defensive routefinding consists
of making choices that mitigate the risks that others
may pose. Careful selection of routes through ter-
rain, and, to a lesser extent, times to pass through ter-
rain, can strongly limit the chance that another party’s
avalanche might hit us.
Examples:
• Many ridgelines are not susceptible to slides from
above – traveling upon such a ridgeline provides
substantial protection from inter-party hazard.
• Some routes pass through areas of unavoidable
avalanche hazard – there are plenty of examples:
The Mousetrap[58] at Rogers Pass, Source Lake
Basin and Mushroom Couloir at Snoqualmie Pass.
Avoiding those areas during times that human-
triggered slides are likely, rather than only when
natural slides are likely, will limit the risk of an
inter-party incident.
• The Hawkins Mountain (Section III L) and Turbo
Hillclimb (Section IIID) accidents make clear
the danger of extended loitering in inter-party-
avalanche terrain. When assessing safe spots, the
likelihood of human triggers above must be con-
sidered.
• Avalanches only happen in avalanche terrain –
avoiding avalanche terrain is a sure-fire way to
avoid avalanche incidents of all kinds, including
inter-party incidents.
Choosing not to travel (down or up) routes at times
that we expect others might be ascending or descending
is also a form of defensive routefinding. Anticipating
the choices of others and making our own conservative
diversion or delay in order to limit the risks we might
present to others is a mark of a conscientious traveler.
2. Active measures
When we travel in start zones, we are potential trig-
gers for avalanches. In addition to passive measures to
ensure that we are not traveling above other people,
there are small measures we can take to communicate
with those who might be below. Radios (see Section
IVE) are the superior method of communication in the
backcountry, but are not used by everyone, nor are they
completely reliable. As a simple measure, rock climbers
and mountaineers yell “Rope!” before tossing down a
rappel rope, “On Rappel!” before rappelling (which can
8dislodge rock), “Off Rappel” to communicate to those
above and below, and “Rope” again, when the rope is
pulled (which can generate more rockfall). The word-
ing is important, but in the snow world, something akin
to “Hello Below!”, “Skiing!”, and “Clear!” could provide
warning and an opportunity for communication with
those below. Similarly, for a group entering constrained
terrain from below, it might be appropriate to shout
(or radio (see IVE)), “Entering Couloir!” and make an
occasional shout as they ascend.
Verbal warnings are, of course, antithetical to a low-
impact and quiet winter day (and may lead to confusion,
as shouts are a sign of an emergency). If the rate of
inter-party incidents continues to grow, the necessity
of such measures, and the approximate skier density at
which they are appropriate, will become self-evident. At
a crowded crag, it is perhaps more welcome than it is
jarring to hear a climber yell, “Rope!” as they begin an
orderly descent.
In addition to verbal warnings, making micro-route
decisions during ascent and descent to maximize the
leader’s ability to see up/down-slope can increase the
likelihood of noting a potential inter-party conflict be-
fore it becomes reality.
D. Regional travel standards for routes
Just as we all agree to drive on one side of a road in
order to prevent head-on automotive collisions, commu-
nity standards can improve mutually-beneficial cooper-
ation between parties who have never met.
1. Run lists
In recent years [59, 60], the notion of a “Run List”
has moved from professional operations discussions into
the mainstream. A “run list” is a shared enumera-
tion/mapping of regions and ski runs used to facili-
tate discussion and improve adherence to each day’s
terrain assessment/plan. In courses at the Washington
Alpine Club, run lists have become an integral part of
our courses, and our students often refer to them af-
ter the course is complete. A publicly-shared run list
can serve as a basis for conditions reporting, incident
response, and general communication. While run lists
themselves will not offer any advantage for inter-party
incidents – they may even serve to concentrate travel-
ers during times of higher hazard – a strong basis for
communication is bedrock upon which many mitigation
strategies can be built.
2. Terrain-specific traditions
In certain high-density traffic locations, it may be
helpful to establish certain local traffic patterns. The
aviation industry has “Approach Procedures” and “In-
strument Approach Procedures” (IAP)[61] for most
airports that describe the airport-specific information
needed to land and take off safely. While IAPs con-
tain a level of detail not needed for backcountry travel,
the occasional publicized traffic pattern may be of use.
These may be best described by examples:
Near the Mount Baker Ski Area, there is a backcoun-
try ski run known as “Blueberry Chutes”. It is a high-
traffic run in avalanche terrain, 1.5 km from a parking
lot, with a straightforward and comparatively safe al-
ternative ascent route that reaches the run at the top.
It is also possible to ascend the run directly, which is ar-
duous, slow, exposed to avalanche hazard, and exposed
to skiers dropping in from above. In addition, those
ascending from the bottom sometimes choose to transi-
tion to downhill skiing mid-slope, spending even longer
in a hazardous spot. This location has become the site
of inter-party conflicts[62–64] and can deliver plenty of
consequence[65, 66]. Such a location is a prime opportu-
nity for a simple local understanding – downhill traffic
only in Blueberry Chutes – to be more-formally known.
While this strategy would have an impact on weaker
skiers incapable of skiing the steepest top pitch, it also
protects those weaker skiers from getting clobbered from
above.
The Slot, a couloir on Snoqualmie Mountain near
Snoqualmie Pass, WA, was once regarded as much as
a climbing route[67] as a ski line. In 2004, it was suffi-
ciently rarely skied that it still made occasional sense[68]
to ascend directly up the route for convenience. The
Slot is now routinely skied, even by those who ski be-
fore their day-jobs in Seattle. It is a rare thing to be
the first to the Slot’s entrance after a storm, and it is
common to encounter multiple parties at the entrance.
In the present environment, it is hard to imagine a good
reason to ascend the Slot in winter. The hazard from
above is significant.
The Alpental Ski Area sits in a constrained valley,
with densely-used ski-touring terrain at, and beyond, its
head. The area has a relatively-unique policy of limited
avalanche control within its “Back Bowls” backcountry
terrain. The slide paths and runouts from that terrain
reach the valley bottom. Passing beneath the area dur-
ing times of control work, or traveling beneath the lift-
accessible backcountry during times of instability is in-
advisable. Furthermore, the skiers returning to the ski
area are often traveling fast on the most-tempting skin-
track. Recent efforts[69] have helped to separate uphill
and downhill traffic, and move uphill traffic to safer lo-
cations. The US Ski Mountaineering Association main-
tains an updated list[70] of uphill travel and boundary
policies for ski areas – it could make sense to broaden it,
or a similar repository, to include travel traditions for
high-traffic backcountry terrain.
93. “Run board”
One of the principal difficulties in avoiding conflict
between disparate groups is the simple awareness of the
existence and location of other parties. If parties leaving
a trailhead were to note their number, intended destina-
tion, and approximate schedule, perhaps akin to filing a
flight plan, subsequent parties would have the opportu-
nity to know who might be ahead, and where. Further-
more, if a radio channel were appended, communication
with those ahead might be possible.
The potential problems with such a system are myr-
iad, but it may offer utility to the conscientious.
A run board may be more useful in constrained ter-
rain, like The Slot at Snoqualmie Pass, where entering
parties might note their number and the time at which
they entered, as a note for those who follow behind.
The 370 m-tall couloir has a visibility-obscuring dog-
leg about a third of the way down. Without coordina-
tion between parties in the couloir, it is possible for a
group descending the couloir to be impacted by the ac-
tions of a group they have never seen. A conscientious
party arriving at the Slot’s entrance could, seeing that
a party had entered the couloir only minutes before,
choose to wait a few minutes for those below to clear
the run. The social-network share-ability of a photo of
a run board atop a popular run (#firsttracks ?) might
increase the likelihood of its use. A “run-clock”, fash-
ioned after the out-of-office “back at 3pm” clock-signs,
altered to “dropped in at 7:45 am” may suffice.
E. Radios
Radios have emerged as an increasingly common tool
in the backcountry – remarkable for a sport which es-
chews complication and weight. In the author’s North
American experience, FRS/GMRS radios are a de-facto
standard, the range limitations of the FRS/GMRS stan-
dards are eclipsed by the unlicensed nature of the spec-
trum3. In 2018, these radios have as many as 14 pos-
sible <1 km-range (FRS)[71] channels and partially-
overlapping 14 3-10 km-range (GMRS)[72–74] channels.
In addition to the utility radios have for communi-
cation within a party[75], radios have the potential to
improve situational awareness and coordination between
parties.
1. Community channel/party channel
Some regions, Telluride’s Bear Creek in particular,
have begun to define community radio channels [76–80].
Both a glance at a map of Bear Creek and the inclusion
3 GMRS has a licensing requirement in the United States, though
many users do not apply for one
of two Bear Creek accidents in this paper suggest that,
for Bear Creek locals, inter-party coordination is essen-
tial. While the majority of the documentation praising
the effort has, perhaps necessarily, been from the ra-
dio manufacturer, community radio channels appear to
have made a positive difference in promoting coordina-
tion between parties and speeding rescue efforts. In-
deed, the court decision[50] regarding the Grandfather
Couloir accident specifically states that radios are “com-
monly used to facilitate communication between groups
in similar scenarios.”
As party density increases, it may be necessary for
backcountry-specific radio manufacturers to add the
ability to monitor a community channel and an intra-
party channel simultaneously, so that intra-party com-
munication need not obstruct inter-party communica-
tion. Such a system could be confusing in the haste
of an incident – good radio discipline on a party chan-
nel is preferable, so long as it remains practical. Steen
and Edgerly[76] make a similar suggestion of a the ad-
dition of a “scan” functionality to future radios. Avi-
ation radios[81, 82] have two-channel “Active”-channel
and “Standby”-channel functionality, enabling listening
to both and transmitting on one or the other easily.
FRS/GMRS radios, in general, offer the user the re-
verse feature. Digital “privacy codes” can be used define
a sub-channel by selective muting within each channel.
Operating the radio tuned to a channel, but without a
“privacy code”, may allow a listener to hear all of the
traffic on a particular channel. An example: A radio
tuned to “4-20” will make audible only those transmis-
sions sent from other “4-20” radios. A radio tuned to “4”
alone will hear transmissions from “4, 4-1, 4-2, ..., 4-20,
... “. If radio traffic is not copious, such a setting could
provide the wary traveler with slightly more information
about other parties.
V. EXTENSIONS
The model presented in Section II is general, and
should extend to the estimation of rates for other inter-
party backcountry interactions. Krause[15] points out
that inter-party rescues may be of similar interest.
Inter-party rescues and inter-party observations are in-
teresting both for understanding the rate at which inter-
party rescues occur and as a proxy for inter-party in-
volvement rates. As the area, Aobservation, over which
one party can see or hear an avalanche triggered by an-
other party is much larger than Aavalanche, we should
expect the rate at which parties observe avalanches
triggered by others to be much higher than the rate
of inter-party involvements. If Aobservation is substi-
tuted for Aavalanche, the mathematics should be the
same. The model then predicts that the rate of inter-
party avalanche observations/rescues should be roughly
rinter-party observation ≈ r0Aobservationn2party. As avalanche
observations and rescues happen far more often than
fatal accidents, there may be an opportunity for new
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research with more-reliable statistics.
VI. CONCLUSION
We made a first-principles estimation of the scaling of
inter-party avalanche involvements with party-density
and found it to be quadratic. Furthermore, we find that
inter-party involvements should become a significant
fraction of all avalanche involvements when the localized
party density approaches one party per avalanche area.
This result is independent of the day’s likelihood of trig-
gering avalanches, and may have utility for avalanche
forecasters.
We explored a series of North-American avalanche
incidents in order to show varied ways in which inter-
party involvements have occurred. Moreover, the party-
densities at which these incidents occurred are roughly
consistent with the model, with many incidents near
npartyAavalanche ∼ 0.1.
We enumerated and discussed a number of possi-
ble strategies for mitigating inter-party avalanche haz-
ards. Improved awareness, spreading our parties out
over greater area, traveling with others in mind, imple-
menting regional travel standards, and communicating
more-effectively may all help to limit the number of in-
volvements.
As this work was first drafted in an Autumn-2018
Seattle coffee shop, customers discussed how their
friends encountered “lines of cars” at a local hiking
trailhead. This aligns with our experience in recent
years, with unprecedented numbers of wilderness
travelers at every trailhead and the disappearance of
lonely places in the Cascades. Inter-party avalanche
involvements are coming, if they have not already
arrived. It behooves us, individually and as a commu-
nity, to develop strategies to proactively address this
emerging hazard.
The source code and data needed to generate this
document are freely-available[83].
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Appendix A: Correctly handling Nparties
Here, we estimate, without approximation with re-
gard to Nparties, the quantities derived in Section II.
We begin with the same initial assumption:
rsingle-party = r0
Nparties
A
But now, we include the fact that if there are Nparties
parties exploring the area A, only Nparties − 1 parties
can be caught in an inter-party avalanche.
rinterparty = rsingle-party(Nparties − 1)Aavalanche
A
which simplifies to
rinterparty = r0n
2
partyAavalanche
Nparties − 1
Nparties
.
Here, we see that the correction we will need is, in gen-
eral, a factor of (Nparties−1)/Nparties, which is bounded
above by 1 and below by 1/2.
The definition of the total rate remains unchanged
r = rsingle-party + rinterparty
and Equation 4 is modified to
rinter-party
r
=
1
1
npartyAavalanche
Nparties−1
Nparties
+ 1
.
It is then clear that the true figure of merit is
npartyAavalanche
Nparties − 1
Nparties
and the critical density is
ncritical =
Nparties
Nparties − 1
1
Aavalanche
.
This passes the sanity check, as when Nparties = 2,
ncritical is two parties per avalanche area – all the parties
in the area have to be in the same avalanche incident
in order for an inter-party involvement to occur. When
Nparties is large, no such coincidence is required.
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Appendix B: Estimating the triggering-likelihood r0
It is interesting to discern what underpins the
likelihood-of-triggering r0.
Let the area of the day’s typical start zones be
Astart-zone and the density of start-zones be nstart-zones ≡
Nstart-zones/A. In a day’s travel, a party will affect
the snow on a convoluted strip of width wparty and
length l, hence Aparty = lwparty or, more-generally,
Aparty = wpartyspartyt, where sparty is the party’s speed
and t the day’s travel time. For a ski party, w ∼ 1 m,
and s ∼ 10 km/d. The number of slides Nslides triggered
in a day is then:
Nslides = Nparties
Aparty
A
Nstart-zonesAstart-zoneftrigger
where ftrigger is the number of trigger points per unit
area in the start zones. When avalanche-conditions are
‘touchy’, ftrigger ∼ 1 m−2; when conditions are ‘stub-
born’, ftrigger  1 m−2. Nstart-zonesAstart-zone is neces-
sarily smaller than A.
This model passes two simple limiting-case checks: If
there is but one square meter of triggerable area, and
a single party covers 10 km/d (0.01 km2), and A =
1 km2, we should expect 0.01 slides/day. If every square
meter is a triggerable start-zone, we should expect to see
10,000 slides/day.
If we switch to densities (rsingle-partyt ≡ Nslides/A):
rsingle-partytA = npartyApartynstart-zonesAstart-zoneftriggerA
rsingle-party = wpartyspartyftriggernpartynstart-zonesAstart-zone
where nslides has units of slides per unit time per unit
area.
For simplicity, we define
r0 ≡ wpartyspartyftriggernstart-zonesAstart-zone
so that
rsingle-party = r0nparty
as required. r0 will depend upon party-type, as sparty
varys by at least an order of magnitude between mech-
anized and non-mechanized travel.
1. Sensitivity to area estimation
These estimations are sensitive to the determination
of A, which is subjective. If our parties and start-zones
are uniformly distributed (an underlying assumption of
the model), these rates are insensitive to A. If our par-
ties tend to congregate near start-zones within A, but
the connected terrain is larger, A’s determination be-
comes challenging.
The crossover, ncritical, from single-party involve-
ments to inter-party involvements is least-sensitive:
npartyAavalanche =
NpartiesAavalanche
A
Absolute-rate estimations are more sensitive, as
rsingle-party =
NpartiesNstart-zones
A2
wpartyspartyftriggerAstart-zone
For these reasons, it will be difficult for quantitative
estimates of these rates and critical densities to be more
accurate than a factor of two in many cases.
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